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Abstract. In cryptography, secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
protocols allow participants to compute a function jointly while keep-
ing their inputs private. Recent breakthroughs are bringing MPC into
practice, solving fundamental challenges for secure distributed compu-
tation. Just as with classic protocols for encryption and key exchange,
precise guarantees are needed for MPC designs and implementations;
any flaw will give attackers a chance to break privacy or correctness. In
this paper we present the first (as far as we know) formalisation of some
MPC security proofs. These proofs provide probabilistic guarantees in
the computational model of security, but have a different character to
machine proofs and proof tools implemented so far — MPC proofs use
a simulation approach, in which security is established by showing in-
distinguishability between execution traces in the actual protocol execu-
tion and an ideal world where security is guaranteed by definition. We
show that existing machinery for reasoning about probabilistic programs
adapted to this setting, paving the way to precisely check a new class of
cryptography arguments. We implement our proofs using the CryptHOL
framework inside Isabelle/HOL.
Keywords: oblivious transfer, cryptography, simulation-based proof, for-
mal verification
1 Introduction
Correctness guarantees are essential for cryptographic protocols and it is an area
where formalisation continues to have impact. Older work was restricted to the
symbolic (Dolev-Yao) model [11], where cryptographic primitives are modelled
as abstract operations and assumed to be unbreakable. The symbolic model
provides a baseline for correctness but modern cryptography is based on the
more realistic computational model [1]. Adversaries are now allowed to break
primitives, but are assumed to have limited computational power — typically,
polynomial time in a security parameter n, such as a key size. Proofs in the
computational model provide probabilistic guarantees: an adversary can break
a security property only with negligible probability, i.e. probability bounded
This work was supported by The Alan Turing Institute under the EPSRC grant
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2by a negligible function µ(n). There are two main proof styles, the game-based
approach [22] and the simulation-based approach sometimes called the real/ideal
world paradigm [14].
The simulation-based approach is a general proof technique especially useful
for arguing about security of Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols. MPC
is an area of cryptography concerned with enabling multiple parties to jointly
evaluate a public function on their private inputs, without disclosing unnecessary
information (that is, without leaking any information about their respective in-
puts that cannot be deduced from their sizes or the result of the computation).
Several generic techniques can be used for that goal including Yao’s garbled
circuits [15, 23], the GMW protocol [12], and other protocols based on secret-
sharing [8,16]. These differ in whether they are designed for an arbitrary or fixed
number of parties, how the computed function is represented (e.g, Boolean vs.
arithmetic circuits), which functions can be represented (e.g, bounded-degree
polynomials vs. arbitrary polynomials), as well trade-offs regarding communica-
tion, computation requirements, and security guarantees.
In the last decade, groundbreaking developments have brought MPC closer
to practice. Efficient implementations of the protocols listed above are avail-
able [9, 13, 17, 24], and we are now seeing the beginning of general solutions to
fundamental security challenges of distributed computation. Security in these
settings is proved by establishing a simulation between the real world, where the
protocol plays out, and an ideal world, which is taken as the definition of secu-
rity. This formalises the intuition that a protocol is secure if it can be simulated
in an ideal environment in which there is no data leakage by definition.
A central protocol in MPC is Oblivious Transfer (OT), which allows a sender
to provide several values and a receiver to choose some of them to receive,
without learning the others, and without the sender learning which has been
chosen. In this paper we build up to a security proof of the Naor-Pinkas OT [20], a
practically important 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol (the receiver chooses
one out of two messages). This can be used as a foundation for more general
MPC, as secure evaluation of arbitrary circuits can be based on OT [12].
Contribution. As far as we know, this is the first formalisation of MPC proofs
in a theorem prover. Our contributions are as follows.
– Starting from the notion of computational indistinguishablity, we formalise
the simulation technique following the general form given by Lindell [14].
– Lindell’s method spells out a process but leaves details of reasoning to in-
formal arguments in the cryptographer’s mind; to make this fully rigorous,
we use probabilistic programs to encode views of the real and ideal worlds
which can be successively refined to establish equivalence. This is a general
method which can be followed for other protocols and in other systems; it
corresponds to hybrid arguments often used in cryptography.
– As examples of the method, we show information-theoretic security for a
two-party secure multiplication protocol that uses a trusted initialiser, and a
proof of security in the semi-honest model of the Naor-Pinkas OT protocol.
3The latter involves a reduction to the DDH assumption (a computational
hardness assumption).
– Finally, we demonstrate how a formalisation of security of a 1-out-of-2 OT
can be extended to formalising the security of an AND gate.
We build on Andreas Lochbihler’s recent CryptHOL framework [18], which pro-
vides tools for encoding probabilistic programs using a shallow embedding inside
Isabelle/HOL. Lochbihler has used his framework for game-based cryptographic
proofs, along similar lines to proofs constructed in other theorem provers [2,21]
and dedicated tools such as EasyCrypt [3].
Outline. In Sect. 2 we give an overview of the key parts of CryptHOL that we
use and extend. Sect. 3 shows how we define computational indistinguishability
in Isabelle and Sect. 4 shows how it is used to define simulation-based security.
In Sect. 4.1 we demonstrate how we use a probabilistic programming framework
to do proofs in the simulation-based setting. Sect. 5 gives the proof of security
of a secure multiplication protocol as a warm up and Sect. 6 shows the proof
of security of the Naor-Pinkas OT protocol. In Sect. 7 we show how an OT
protocol can be used to securely compute an AND gate, paving the way towards
generalised protocols. Our formalisation is available online [19].
2 CryptHOL and Extensions
CryptHOL is a probabilistic programming framework based around subprob-
ability mass functions (spmfs). An spmf encodes a discrete (sub) probability
distribution. More precisely, an spmf is a real valued function on a finite domain
that is non negative and sums to at most one. Such functions have type α spmf
for a domain which is a set of elements of type α. We use the notation from [18]
and let p!x denote the subprobability mass assigned by the spmf p to the event
x. The weight of an spmf is given by ||p|| =
∑
y p!y where the sum is taken over
all elementary events of the corresponding type; this is the total mass of proba-
bility assigned by the spmf p. If ||p|| = 1 we say p is lossless. Another important
function used in our proofs is scale. The expression scale r p scales, by r, the
subprobability mass of p. That is, we have scale r p!x = r.(p!x) for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1||p|| .
Probabilistic programs can be encoded as sequences of functions that com-
pute over values drawn from spmfs. The type α spmf is used to instantiate
the polymorphic monad operations returnspmf :: α ⇒ α spmf and bindspmf ::
α spmf ⇒ (α⇒ β spmf )⇒ β spmf .
This gives a shallow embedding for probabilistic programs which we use to
define simulations and views, exploiting the monadic do notation. As usual,
do {x← p; f} stands for bindspmf p (λx. do f).
We note that bindspmf is commutative and constant elements cancel. In par-
ticular if p is a lossless spmf, then
bindspmf p (λ . q) = q. (1)
4Equation 1 can be shown using the lemma bind spmf const,
bindspmf p (λx. q) = scalespmf (weightspmf p) q (2)
and the fact sample uniform is lossless and thus has weight equal to one. In
Equation 2, weightspmf p is ||p|| described above.
The monad operations give rise to the functorial structure, mapspmf :: (α⇒
β)⇒ α spmf ⇒ β spmf .
mapspmf f p = bindspmf p (λx. returnspmf (f x)) (3)
CryptHOL provides an operation, sample uniform :: nat⇒ nat spmf where
sample uniform n = spmf of set {.. < n}, the lossless spmf which distributes
probability uniformly to a set of n elements. Of particular importance in cryp-
tography is the uniform distribution coin spmf = spmf of set {True,False}.
Sampling from this corresponds to a coin flip.
We also utilise the function assert spmf :: bool ⇒ unit spmf which takes a
predicate and only allows the computation to continue if the predicate holds.
If it does not hold the current computation is aborted. It also allows the proof
engine to pick up on the assertion made.
One way we extend the work of CryptHOL is by adding one time pad lemmas
needed in our proofs of security. We prove a general statement given in Lemma
1 and instantiate it prove the one time pads we require.
Lemma 1. Let f be injective and surjective on {.. < q}. Then we have
mapspmf f (sample uniform q) = sample uniform q.
Proof. By definition, sample uniform q = spmf of set {.. < q}. Thenmapspmf f
(spmf of set {.. < q}) = spmf of set(f 8 {.. < q}) follows by simplification and
the injective assumption (the infix 8 is the image operator). Simplification uses
the lemma map spmf of set inj on:
inj on f A =⇒ mapspmf (spmf of set A) = spmf of set (f
8 A).
We then have mapspmf f (spmf of set {.. < q}) = spmf of set({.. < q}) by
using the surjectivity assumption. The lemma then follows from the definition
of sample uniform . ⊓⊔
We note a weaker assumption, namely f 8 {.. < q} ⊆ {.. < q} can be used in-
stead of the surjectivity assumption. To complete the proof with this assumption
we use the endo inj surj rule which states
finite A =⇒ f 8 A ⊆ A =⇒ inj on f A =⇒ f 8 A = A.
For the maps we use we prove injectivity and show surjectiveity using this.
Lemma 2 (Transformations on uniform distributions).
1. mapspmf (λb. (y − b) mod q) (sample uniform q) = sample uniform q.
52. mapspmf (λb. (y + b) mod q) (sample uniform q) = sample uniform q.
3. mapspmf (λb. (y + x.b) mod q) (sample uniform q) = sample uniform q.
Proof. These follow with the help of Lemma 1. Case 3 holds only under the
additional assumption that x and q are coprime. This will always be the case in
the applications we consider as x ∈ Zq and q is a prime. ⊓⊔
3 Computational Indistinguishability in Isabelle
We introduce the notion of computational indistinguishability as the definitions
of security we give in Section 4 rely on it. We use the definition from [14].
Definition 1. A probability ensemble X = {X(a, n)} is a sequence of random
variables indexed by a ∈ {0, 1}∗ and n ∈ N. Two ensembles X and Y are said to
be computationally indistinguishable, written X
c
≡ Y , if for every non-uniform
polynomial-time algorithm D there exists a negligible function3 ǫ such that for
every a and every n ∈ N,
|Pr[D(X(a, n)) = 1]− Pr[D(Y (a, n)) = 1]| ≤ ǫ(n)
The original definition restricts a ∈ {0, 1}∗, but we generalise this to an
arbitrary first-order type, α. We model a probability ensemble as having some
input of of this type, and a natural number security size parameter. The space
of events considered depends on the view ; also of arbitrary first-order type, ν.
type synonym (α, ν) ensemble = α⇒ nat⇒ ν spmf
We do not formalise a notion of polynomial-time programs in Isabelle as we
do not need it to capture the following proofs. In principle this could be done with
a deep embedding of a programming language, its semantic denotation function
and a complexity measure. Instead, we will assume a family of constants giving
us the set of all polynomial-time distinguishers for every type ν, indexed by a
size parameter.
A polynomial-time distinguisher “characterises” an arbitrary spmf.
consts polydist :: nat⇒ (ν spmf ⇒ bool spmf ) set
Now we can formalise Definition 1 directly as:
comp indist :: (α, ν) ensemble ⇒ (α, ν) ensemble ⇒ bool
where comp indist X Y ≡
∀(D :: ν spmf ⇒ bool spmf ).
∃ (ǫ :: nat ⇒ real). negligible ǫ ∧
(∀ (a :: α) (n :: nat).
(D ∈ polydist n) −→
|spmf (D (X a n)) True − spmf (D (Y a n)) True| ≤ ǫ n))
3 A negligible function is a function ǫ :: N → R such that for all c ∈ N there exists
Nc ∈ N such that for all x > Nc we have |ǫ(x)| <
1
xc
64 Semi-Honest Security and Simulation-Based Proofs
In this section we first define security in the semi-honest adversary model us-
ing the simulation-based approach. We then show how we use a probabilistic
programming framework to formally prove security.
A protocol is an algorithm that describes the interaction between parties
and can be modelled as a set of probabilistic programs. A two party protocol
π computes a map from pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs. This map is called
the protocol’s functionality as it represents the specification of what the proto-
col should achieve. It can be formalised as a pair of (potentially probabilistic)
functions
f1 : input1 × input2 −→ output1
f2 : input1 × input2 −→ output2
which represent each party’s output independently. The composed pairing is the
functionality, f , of type
f : input1 × input2 −→ output1 × output2
where f = (f1, f2). That is, given inputs (x, y) the functionality outputs (f1(x, y),
f2(x, y)). This indicates that party one gets f1(x, y) and party two gets f2(x, y)
as output. In general the types of inputs and outputs can be arbitrary. For our
instantiation we use concrete types depending on the functionality concerned.
For the initial example secure multiplication protocol we consider in Section
5 we have the probabilistic functionality f(x, y) = (s1, s2) where s1 + s2 = x.y.
Each party obtains an additive share of the multiplication. The protocol is run
using a publicly known field Zq where q is a prime number dependent on the
security parameter. To ensure neither of the outputs alone reveal the value of
x.y, we uniformly sample one of the outputs in the functionality
f(x, y) = (s1, x.y − s1), s1
$
←− Zq (4)
The notation s1
$
←− Zq means we sample s1 uniformly from Zq. The Isabelle
definition of the functionality is given below. It makes use of the do notation:
f x y = do {
s1 ← sample uniform q;
returnspmf (s1, x.y − s1)}
This functionality is easy to compute if one does not consider security; the
parties can share their inputs and compute it. But with the security requirement
that neither party learns anything about the others’ input the problem becomes
harder. We will give a protocol that securely computes this functionality later.
We first introduce the notions used to define security. Security is based on views
which capture the information known by each party. We follow the definitions
given by Lindell in [14] to define security in the semi-honest model.
7Definition 2. Let π be a two party protocol with inputs (x, y) and with security
parameter n.
– The real view of the ith party (here i ∈ {1, 2}) is denoted by
viewpii (x, y, n) = (w, r
i,mi1, ...,m
i
t)
where w ∈ {x, y} and is dependent on which view we are considering, ri
accumulates random values generated by the party during the execution of
the protocol, and the mij are the messages received by the party.
– Denote the output of the ith party, outputpii (x, y, n), and the joint output as
outputpi(x, y, n) = (outputpi1 (x, y, n), output
pi
2 (x, y, n)).
Definition 3. A protocol π is said to securely compute f in the presence of
a semi-honest adversary if there exist probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
(simulators) S1, S2 such that
{S1(1
n, x, f1(x, y)), f(x, y)}
c
≡ {viewpi1 (x, y, n), output
pi(x, y, n)}
{S2(1
n, y, f2(x, y)), f(x, y)}
c
≡ {viewpi2 (x, y, n), output
pi(x, y, n)}.
A semi-honest adversary is one that follows the protocol description. The
simulator is given a unary encoding of the security parameter.
This definition formalises the idea that a protocol is secure if whatever can
be computed by a party can also be computed from only the input and output
of the party meaning that nothing extra is learned from the protocol.
For the secure multiplication protocol and the receiver’s security in the Naor-
Pinkas OT we prove security in an information theoretic sense. This means even
computationally unbounded adversaries cannot gain extra information from the
protocol. This is shown by proving the two sets of distributions above are equal.
Information theoretic security is a stronger notion of security than computational
indistinguishability and Isabelle proves the former implies the latter with ease.
A functionality is deterministic if given inputs always produce the same out-
put. For a deterministic protocol it is shown in [14] that the above definition can
be relaxed. We require correctness and
{S1(1
n, x, f1(x, y))}
c
≡ {viewpi1 (x, y, n)} (5)
{S2(1
n, y, f2(x, y))}
c
≡ {viewpi2 (x, y, n)} (6)
For a protocol to be correct we require that for all x, y and n there exists a
negligible function µ such that
Pr[outputpi(x, y, n) 6= f(x, y)] ≤ µ(n).
The Naor-Pinkas OT protocol, and the OT we use in the AND gate protocol
given later, are both deterministic. The secure multiplication protocol however
is not. For the deterministic cases we will focus on the more interesting property,
showing the views are equal. As such when we refer to a deterministic protocol
as being secure we explicitly show Equations 5 and 6 and assume correctness.
For the non-deterministic secure multiplication protocol we must show exactly
the property given in Definition 3.
84.1 Probabilistic Programming used for Simulation-Based Proofs
CryptHOL provides a strong foundation from which to manipulate and show
equivalence between probabilistic programs. So far it has only been used to
prove security in the game-based setting. The game-based definitions of security
use a game played between an adversary and a benign challenger. The players
are modelled as probabilistic programs and communicate with each other. The
definition of security is tied to some event which is defined as the output of
the security game. In general, proofs describe a reduction of a sequence of games
(probabilistic programs) that end in a game where it can be shown the adversary
has the same advantage of winning over the challenger as it would have against
a problem assumed to be hard. The games in the sequence are then shown to be
equivalent. This is shown on the left hand side of Fig. 1. We use a probabilistic
Game-based Simulation-based
G1 R
1 S1
 c
≡
c
≡
...
...
...
 c
≡
c
≡
Gn Rn
c
≡ Sn
Fig. 1. A comparison between the game-based and simulation-based approaches. The
game-based approach uses reductions (denoted ) whereas in the simulation approach
we show computational indistinguishability between probabilistic programs.
programming framework to construct simulation-based proofs. Our method of
proof models the simulator and the real view of the protocol as probabilistic
programs. In the right hand side of Fig. 1 we start with the real view of the
protocol, R1, and the simulator, S1. We define a series of intermediate proba-
bilistic programs (Ri, Si) which we show to be computationally indistinguishable
(or equal in the case of information theoretic security) — this is referred to as
the hybrid argument in cryptography. This sequence ends in Rn and Sn which
we show to be computationally indistinguishable (or equal). We have shown the
diagram for the simulation-based approach in Fig. 1 is transitive.
Lemma 3. Let X, Y and Z be probability ensembles then we have
[X
c
≡ Y ; Y
c
≡ Z] =⇒ X
c
≡ Z.
For the non-deterministic secure multiplication protocol we will construct
the protocol and functionality outputs in the real and simulated views, instead
of constructing them separately and combining them to form the ensembles.
95 Secure Multiplication Protocol
We now present a protocol that computes the functionality in Equation 4. The
protocol requires some pre-generation of elements to be distributed to the parties.
This is known in MPC as the preprocessing model [5], where the parties run an
offline phase to generate correlated random triples — sometimes called Beaver
triples — that are used to perform fast secure multiplications in an online phase.
For this task we assume a trusted initialiser that aids in the computation. We
a, b, r
$
←− Zq
(c1, d1)← (a, r), (c2, d2)← (b, a.b− r)
P1 P2
(c1, d1), x ∈ Zq (c2, d2), y ∈ Zq
e2 ← x+ c1
e2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−⊲ e2
e1
e1
⊳−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− e1 ← y − c2
s1 ← x.e1 − d1 s2 ← e2.c2 − d2
Fig. 2. A protocol for secure multiplication
denote the assignment of variables by a← b and all operations are taken modulo
q. The claim of security is:
Theorem 1. The protocol in Fig. 2 securely computes the functionality given
in Equation 4 in the semi-honest adversary model.
Intuitively, security results from the messages being sent in the protocol
always being masked by some randomness. In the message party one sends, e2,
the input (x) is masked by the uniform sample, c1. Likewise in the message party
two sends, e1, the input (y) is masked by the uniform sample, c2.
5.1 Formal Proof of Security
The simulator and the real view of party one are defined in Isabelle as in Fig. 3.
Recall that the simulator receives as input the input of the party it is simulating
and the output of the functionality of the party it is simulating.
Note that the simulator S1 takes uses y in the construction of the functional-
ity output. This is allowed by the security definition as f (x , y) depends on both
inputs.
To show information theoretic security we prove that the two probabilistic
programs given in Fig 3 are equal - when s′1, the input to the simulator is the
first output of the functionality. This involves a series of small equality steps
between intermediate probabilistic programs as shown in Fig 1. In particular, in
the series of intermediate programs we manipulate the real and simulated views.
We note that c′1 , e
′
1 and s
′
1 are random samples that are independent from each
10
S1 x s
′
1 = do { R1 x y = do {
c′1 ← sample uniform q; ((c1, d1), (c2, d2))← TI ;
e′1 ← sample uniform q; let e1 = (y − c2) mod q;
let d′1 = (x.e
′
1 − s
′
1) mod q; let e2 = (x+ c1) mod q;
let s′2 = (x.y − s
′
1) mod q; let s1 = (x.e1 − d1) mod q;
returnspmf (x, c
′
1, d
′
1, e
′
1, s
′
1, s
′
2)} let s2 = (e2.c2 − d2) mod q;
returnspmf (x, c1, d1, e1, s1, s2)}
Fig. 3. Probabilistic programs to output the real and simulated views for party one.
Here, TI is the trusted initialiser.
other, x and y and we have s′2 = (x.y − s
′
1) mod q and d
′
1 = (x.e
′
1 − s
′
1) mod q.
By showing these relationships, and only these relationships, hold for the real
view too we show the two views are equal.
This gives us the first half of formal security which can be seen in Lemma 4
Lemma 4. For all inputs x and y we have, S1 x y = R1 x y. This implies the
definition of security we gave in Sect. 4, S1 x y
c
≡ R1 x y.
The proof of security for party two is similar, where the relationships to
consider are s′2 = (x.y − s
′
1) mod q and d
′
2 = (e
′
2.c
′
2 − s
′
2) mod q. Together,
Lemmas 4 and 5 establish Theorem 1.
Lemma 5. For all inputs x and y we have, S2 x y = R2 x y. This implies the
definition of security we gave in Sect. 4, S2 x y
c
≡ R2 x y.
6 Naor-Pinkas Protocol
In the Naor-Pinkas OT protocol [20] we work with a cyclic group G of order q
where q is a prime, for which the DDH assumption holds. The Decisional Diffie
Hellman (DDH) assumption [10] is a computational hardness assumption on
cyclic groups. Informally, the assumption states that given ga and gb, where a
and b are uniform samples from Zq, the group element g
a.b looks like a random
element from G. A triple of the form (ga, gb, ga.b) is called a DDH triple. In
the protocol, given in Fig 4, the Sender (party one) begins with input messages
(m0,m1) ∈ G
2 and the Receiver (party two) begins with v ∈ {0, 1}, the choice
bit. At the end of the protocol the receiver will know mv but will learn nothing
about m1−v and the sender will not learn v.
We prove information theoretic security in the semi-honest model for the
receiver. Security for the sender is proven with a reduction to the DDH assump-
tion. In particular, the receiver is only able to decrypt mv as the corresponding
ciphertext is a valid ElGamal ciphertext, while m1−v is garbage.
In the protocol description, given in Fig 4, DDH-SR refers to a DDH ran-
dom self reduction operation which takes DDH triples to DDH triples and non
DDH triples to non DDH triples. The reduction is defined as follows. Given
11
P1 (Sender) P2 (Receiver)
(m0, m1) ∈ G
2 v ∈ {0, 1}
a, b
$
←− Zq
cv = a.b, c1−v
$
←− Zq
x← ga, y ← gb
z0 ← g
c0 , z1 ← g
c1
A = (g, x, y, z0)
(x , y , z0 , z1 )
⊳−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
B = (g, x, y, z1)
verifies z0 6= z1
(g, x1, y1, z
′
0)
DDH-SR
←−−−−− A
(g, x2, y2, z
′
1)
DDH-SR
←−−−−− B
CT0 = (y0,m0.z
′
0)
CT1 = (y1,m1.z
′
1) −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−⊲ CT0, CT1
decrypts CTv
Fig. 4. The Naor-Pinkas OT protocol
an input tuple (g, gx, gy, gz), one picks a, b uniformly from Zq and outputs
(g, g(x+b)a, gy, g(z+b.y)a). The role of the DDH random self reduction is to destroy
any partial information in the message the Receiver sends to the Sender.
Theorem 2. The protocol defined in Fig. 4 securely computes a 1-out-of-2 OT
in the semi-honest adversary model.
6.1 The Formal Proof
We have a deterministic protocol and so do not include the overall functionality
as part of the views. We must first consider the DDH-SR. In particular the two
cases, when the input tuple is a DDH triple and when it is not. In both cases we
simplify the operation that is performed. The simplified definitions are given in
Fig 5 and the formal statements in Lemmas 6 and 7:
DDH SR triple x y z = do { DDH SR non triple x y z = do {
x1 ← sample uniform q; x1, x2 ← sample uniform q;
returnspmf (g, g
x1 , gy, gy.x1 mod q)} returnspmf (g, g
x1 , gy, gx2)}
Fig. 5. The two simplified probabilistic programs for the DDH triples and non-triples.
Lemma 6. For all x, y, z such that z = y.x mod q we have
DDH SR x y z = DDH SR triple x y z.
Lemma 7. For all x, y, z such that z 6= y.x mod q we have
DDH SR x y z = DDH SR non triple x y z.
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The Simulators and Views. First we consider party two. In constructing the
real and simulated views we use the assert function to ensure the condition given
in the protocol in Fig 4, z0 6= z1, holds. This ensures that only one of A and B
is a DDH triple; the other is not and hence the corresponding ciphertext CT0 or
CT1 cannot be decrypted. The simulator may take as inputs v ∈ {0, 1} and CTv
(although does not require it). We use ⊗ to denote multiplication in the group
(as in Isabelle). The real view and simulator are shown below.
S2 v = do { R2 m0 m1 v = do {
a, b← sample uniform q; a, b← sample uniform q;
let cv = a.b; let cv = a.b;
c′v ← sample uniform q; c
′
v ← sample uniform q;
← assert spmf (c′v 6= b.a mod q); ← assert spmf (c
′
v 6= b.a mod q);
x0 ← sample uniform q; (g, x0, y0, z
′
0)← DDH SR a b cv;
x1 ← sample uniform q; (g, x1, y1, z
′
1)← DDH SR a b c
′
v;
returnspmf (v, a, b, c
′
v, g
b, gx1 , gb, gx2)} let e0 = z
′
0 ⊗m0;
let e1 = z
′
1 ⊗m1;
returnspmf (v, a, b, c
′
v, y0, e0, y1, e1)}
For party one, the simulator, S1, takes in the two messages (m0,m1) (again,
it does not use them) and the Sender’s output - which amounts to nothing. The
simulator and real view are given below. We note there is no output for the
sender from the functionality so the simulator only takes the messages as input.
S1 (m0,m1) = do { R1 (m0,m1) v = do {
a, b, c← sample uniform q; a, b, c′v ← sample uniform q;
returnspmf (g
a, gb, ga.b, gc1)} let cv = a.b;
returnspmf ((m0,m1), (g
a, gb, if v then
gc
′
v else gcv , if v then gcv else gc
′
v ))}
Proof of Security for the Receiver. From the construction of the real view
one can see the triple (a, b, cv) is a DDH triple and (a, b, c
′
v) is not. Thus we are
able to rewrite the real view using Lemmas 6 and 7.
The only components of the outputs of R2 and S2 which differ, up to un-
folding of definitions are the encryptions. In the real view they are of the form
gz ⊗mi where z is uniformly sampled and in the simulator they are of the form
gz. We utilise a lemma from CryptHOL which states that if c ∈ carrier G then:
mapspmf (λx. g
x ⊗ c) (sample uniform q)
= mapspmf (λx. g
x) (sample uniform q)
This allows us to show our security result stated in Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. For all inputs m0, m1 and v we have, S2 v = R2;m0 m1 v. This
implies the definition of security we gave in Sect. 4, S2 v
c
≡ R2;m0 m1 v.
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Proof of security for the Sender. For v = 0, the proof is trivial as the
simulator and real views are constructed in exactly the same way.
Lemma 9. The case of v = 0 for party one implies for all inputs m0 and m1,
R1 m0 m1 = S1 m0 m1.
The proof for v = 1 is equivalent to showing the distributions (ga, gb, ga.b, gc) and
(ga, gb, gc, ga.b) are computationally indistinguishable, when a, b, c are uniformly
sampled. Here we provide a high level view of the pencil and paper.
To show security we provide a reduction to the DDH assumption, which
implies the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable. In particular
we show that if there exists a D that can distinguish the above two 4-tuples then
one can construct an adversary that breaks the DDH assumption. We use the
formalisation of the DDH assumption from [18].
Definition 4. The DDH advantage for a distinguisher D is defined as
adv ddh(D) = Pr[D((ga, gb, ga.b)) = 1]− Pr[D((ga, gb, gc)) = 1]
where a, b, c
$
←− Zq.
We show the reduction in two steps. First we show a reduction from (ga, gb, gc, ga.b)
to (ga, gb, gc, gd) and then from (ga, gb, gc, gd) to (ga, gb, ga.b, gc) where a, b, c, d
are all uniform samples. Consider the first reduction - we assumes D can distin-
guish the tuples.
DDH Adversary one (Adv1), inputs: D, (α, β, γ) .
– The adversary samples c← sample uniform (order G).
– The provides D with the input (α, β, gc, γ) and outputs whatever D outputs.
The second reduction (using Adv2) is analogous,
Using both of these we can prove security by bounding the advantage an
adversary has of distinguishing between the real and simulated views by the
sum of two DDH advantages, which are assumed to be negligible.
Lemma 10.
spmf (A D (R1 (m0 ,m1 ) v)) True − spmf (A D (S1 (m0 ,m1 ))) True ≤
ddh.adv (Adv1 D (m0 ,m1 )) + ddh.adv (Adv2 D (m0 ,m1 ))
This along with showing information theoretic security (Lemma 8) for the
receiver means we have shown the protocol to be secure in the semi-honest model.
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7 Towards Evaluating Arbitrary Functionalities
Several MPC techniques allow for the secure joint evaluation of any functionality
represented as a Boolean circuit or an arithmetic circuit. At a high level, these
protocols proceed by evaluating the circuit gate by gate while always keeping a
secret share of the partial evaluation. In particular the GMW protocol relies on
OT to securely evaluate AND gates
In this section we use a basic OT protocol (Fig 6) to construct a protocol to
compute the output of an AND gate. The OT protocol we use employs a trusted
initialiser, like the secure multiplication protocol of Section 5. The trusted ini-
tialiser pre-distributes correlated randomness to the parties so they can carry
out the protocol. In particular r0 and r1 are uniformly sampled and given to
party one, and d is uniformly sampled and given to party two along with rd.
The AND gate protocol then uses OT, this is done in a similar way as in the
GMW protocol. The AND gate protocol we use here is taken from [6] and is
described in Fig. 7. This demonstrates that OT can be used in powerful ways to
construct protocols to compute fundamental functions securely.
r0, r1
$
←− {0, 1}, d
$
←− {0, 1}
P1 P2
m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}, r0, r1 b ∈ {0, 1}, d, rd
e e⊳−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− e = b⊕ d
f0 = m0 ⊕ re
f1 = m1 ⊕ r1−e
f0 , f1
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−⊲ f0, f1
mb = fb ⊕ rd
Fig. 6. Single bit OT
Initially we show information theoretic security for the OT construction given
in Fig 6. That is we construct simulators SOT1 and S
OT
2 such that for the appro-
priately defined views ROT1 and R
OT
2 the result in Lemma 11 holds. To do this
we define an appropriate XOR function (⊕) on Booleans and prove a one time
pad lemma on the XOR function.
Lemma 11. ROT1 m0 m1 b = S
OT
1 m0 m1 and R
OT
2 m0 m1 b = S
OT
2 b.
We now define a protocol (Fig 7) to compute an AND gate. The protocol uses
OT as a black box to transfer mb. Each party outputs an additive share of the
desired AND gate output. This protocol is proved secure using the simulation-
based approach. We use Lemma 11 to prove security of this protocol in the
semi-honest model. The real view and the simulator for party A are given in Fig
8. The simulator for party B, SB, is constructed in an analogous way. Using these
simulators we are able to show the AND gate protocol in Fig 7 is information
theoretically secure.
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A B
a ∈ {0, 1} b ∈ {0, 1}
u
$
←− {0, 1}
(m0,m1) = (¬u, a⊕ ¬u)
OT ((m0 ,m1 ), b)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−⊲ mb
output u output mb
Fig. 7. A protocol to compute an AND gate
RA a b = do { SA a = do {
u← coin spmf ; u← coin spmf ;
let m0 = ¬u; let m0 = ¬u;
let m1 = a⊕ (¬u); let m1 = a⊕ (¬u);
r ← ROT1 m0 m1 b; r ← S
OT
1 m0 m1;
returnspmf (u, r)} returnspmf (u, r)}
Fig. 8. Simulator and real view of party A
Lemma 12. Information theoretic security for the AND gate protocol is shown
by the equalities
RA a b = SA a and RB a b = SB b.
We have shown how a simple OT that uses a trusted initialiser can help to
securely compute an AND gate. In general a trusted initialiser would not be
necessary as one can use the N-P OT in the AND gate protocol. There is one
technical issue with doing this. In the N-P OT we work with a group with
multiplication but the AND gate protocol requires addition. In practice this is
overcome by implementing the N-P OT using a ring (which has both operations),
for which the DDH assumption holds. The proof would follow as in the proof
given above, but an extension of the theory of rings in Isabelle is required for
this - something we plan to develop in future work.
8 Conclusion
We have shown a general approach for capturing simulation-based cryptographic
proofs in the computational model, building on Lochbihler’s CryptHOL frame-
work, and giving a proof of the Naor-Pinkas OT protocol. We also have shown
how out technique can be used to formally prove security of a simple two party
protocol for an AND gate based on OT.
Future Work. The work presented here is only a starting point for the develop-
ment of theory and examples of simulation-based proofs. Oblivious Transfer is
a fundamental cryptographic primitive which can be used to construct generic
protocols for MPC. For example, Yao’s garbled circuits use OT as a sub-protocol
to exchange garbled inputs, while the GMW protocol relies on OT for computing
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AND gates. Section 7 took a first step towards a formal proof of the GMW pro-
tocol. Section 7 took a first step towards a formal proof of the GMW protocol.
We plan to extend this work towards formalising general MPC protocols.
Related Work. Many formal techniques and tools have been devised which use
the symbolic model. Work on formalising proofs in the computational model has
begun more recently and is more challenging, requiring mathematical reasoning
about probabilities and polynomial functions, besides logic. The CertiCrypt [2]
tool built in Coq helped to capture the reasoning principles that were imple-
mented directly in the dedicated interactive EasyCrypt tool [3]. Again in Coq,
the Fundamental Cryptographic Framework [21] provides a definitional language
for probabilistic programs, a theory that is used to reason about programs, and
a library of tactics for game-based proofs. Interactive tools seem invaluable for
complex protocols or exploring new techniques, but automatic tools are more
practical when things become routine. CryptoVerif [7] is a tool with a high level
of automation but its scope only stretches to secrecy and authentication in pro-
tocols. AutoG&P [4] is another automated tool dedicated to security proofs for
pairing-based cryptographic primitives. So far, all of these tools have been used
to perform game-based cryptographic proofs and not simulation-based proofs.
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